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Abstract— Many techniques for privacy-preserving data min-
ing (PPDM) have been investigated over the past decade. Often,
the entities involved in the data mining process are end-users
or organizations with limited computing and storage resources.
As a result, such entities may want to refrain from participating
in the PPDM process. To overcome this issue and to take many
other benefits of cloud computing, outsourcing PPDM tasks to
the cloud environment has recently gained special attention. We
consider the scenario where n entities outsource their databases
(in encrypted format) to the cloud and ask the cloud to perform
the clustering task on their combined data in a privacy-preserving
manner. We term such a process as privacy-preserving and
outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC). In this paper, we
propose a novel and efficient solution to the PPODC problem
based on k-means clustering algorithm. The main novelty of our
solution lies in avoiding the secure division operations required in
computing cluster centers altogether through an efficient trans-
formation technique. Our solution builds the clusters securely
in an iterative fashion and returns the final cluster centers to
all entities when a pre-determined termination condition holds.
The proposed solution protects data confidentiality of all the
participating entities under the standard semi-honest model. To
the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to discuss
and propose a comprehensive solution to the PPODC problem
that incurs negligible cost on the participating entities. We
theoretically estimate both the computation and communication
costs of the proposed protocol and also demonstrate its practical
value through experiments on a real dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clustering is one of the commonly used tasks in various
data mining applications. Briefly, clustering [1]–[3] is the
unsupervised classification of data items (or feature vectors)
into groups (or clusters) such that similar data items reside
in the same group. It has immense importance in various
fields, including information retrieval [4], machine learning
[5], pattern recognition [6], image analysis [7], and text mining
[8]. Some real-life applications related to clustering include
categorizing results returned by a search engine in response
to a user’s query, grouping persons into categories based on
their DNA information, etc.
In general, if the data involved in clustering belongs to
a single entity (hereafter referred to as a user), then it can
be done in a trivial fashion. However, in some cases, mul-
tiple users, such as companies, governmental agencies, and
health care organizations, each holding a dataset, may want
to collaboratively perform clustering task on their combined
data and share the clustering results. Due to privacy concerns,
users may not be willing to share their data with the other
users and thus the distributed clustering task1 should be done
in a privacy-preserving manner. This problem, referred to as
privacy-preserving distributed clustering (PPDC), can be best
explained by the following example:
• Consider two health agencies (e.g., the U.S. CDC and the
public health agency of Canada) each holding a dataset
containing the disease patterns and clinical outcomes of
their patients. Since both the agencies have their own data
collecting methods, suppose that they want to cluster their
combined datasets and identify interesting clusters that
would enable directions for better disease control mech-
anisms. However, due to government regulations and the
sensitive nature of the data, they may not be willing to
share their data with one another. Therefore, they have
to collaboratively perform the clustering task on their
joint datasets in a privacy-preserving manner. Once the
clustering process is done, they can exchange necessary
information (after proper sanitization) if needed.
The existing PPDC methods (e.g., [9]–[12]) incur significant
cost (computation, communication and storage) on the partic-
ipating users and thus they are not suitable if the users do
not have sufficient resources to perform the clustering task.
This problem becomes even more serious when dealing with
big data. To address these issues, it is more attractive for the
users to outsource their data as well as the clustering task to the
cloud. However, the cloud cannot be fully trusted by the users
in protecting their data. Thus, to ensure data confidentiality,
users can encrypt their databases locally (using a common
public key) and then outsource them to the cloud. Then, the
goal is for the cloud to perform clustering over the aggregated
encrypted data. We refer to the above process as privacy-
preserving and outsourced distributed clustering (PPODC).
1Note that, a direct application of clustering algorithm locally by each party
is of no use since global evolution of clusters [9] should be taken into account.
It is worth noting that if all the encrypted data resides
on a single cloud, then the only way through which the
cloud can perform the clustering task (assuming that users
do not participate in the clustering process), without ever
decrypting the data, is when the data is encrypted using fully
homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g., [13]). However, recent
results [14] show that fully homomorphic encryption schemes
are very expensive and their usage in practical applications
are decades away. Hence, we believe that at least two cloud
service providers are required to solve the PPODC problem.
In this paper, we propose a new and efficient solution to
the PPODC problem based on the standard k-means clustering
algorithm [15], [16] by utilizing two cloud service providers
(say Amazon and Google) which together form a federated
cloud environment. Our proposed solution protects data con-
fidentiality of all the participating users at all times. We
emphasize that the concept of federated clouds is becoming
increasingly popular and is also identified as one of the
ten High Priority Requirements for U.S. cloud adoption in
the NIST U.S. Government Cloud Computing Technology
Roadmap [17]. Therefore, we believe that developing privacy-
preserving solutions under federated cloud environment will
become increasingly important in the near future.
A. System Model and Problem Definition
In our problem setting, we consider n users denoted by
U1, . . . , Un. Suppose user Ui holds a database Ti with mi data
records and l attributes, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider a scenario
where the n users want to outsource their databases as well as
the k-means clustering process on their combined databases
to a cloud environment. In our system model, we consider
two different entities: (i) the users and (ii) the cloud service
providers. We assume that the users choose two cloud service
providers C1 and C2 (say Amazon and Google) to perform
the clustering task on their combined data.
In this paper, we explicitly assume that C1 and C2 are
semi-honest [18] and they do not collude. After proper service
level agreements with the users, C2 generates a public-secret
key pair (pk, sk) based on the Paillier cryptosystem [19] and
broadcasts pk to all users and C1. A more robust setting would
be for C1 and C2 to jointly generate the public key pk based on
the threshold Paillier cryptosystem (e.g., [20], [21]) such that
the corresponding secret key sk is obliviously split between
the two clouds. Under this case, the secret key sk is unknown
to both clouds and only (random) shares of it are revealed to
C1 and C2. For simplicity, we consider the former asymmetric
setting where C2 generates (pk, sk) in the rest of this paper.
However, our proposed protocol can be easily extended to
the above threshold setting without affecting the underlying
privacy guarantees.
Given the above system architecture, we assume that user
Ui encrypts Ti attribute-wise using pk and outsources the
encrypted database to C1. Another way to outsource the data
is that users can split each attribute value in their database
into two random shares and outsource the shares separately
to each cloud (see Section V-B for more details). A detailed
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Fig. 1. The Proposed PPODC Architecture
information flow between different entities in our system
model is shown in Figure 1. Having outsourced the data,
the main goal of a PPODC protocol is to enable C1 and C2
to perform k-means clustering over the combined encrypted
databases in a privacy-preserving manner. More formally, we
can define a PPODC protocol as follows:
PPODC(〈T1, . . . , Tn〉, β)→ (S1, . . . , Sn) (1)
where β is a pre-defined threshold value agreed upon by all
parties. Since k-means is an iterative method, we use the value
of β to check whether the termination condition holds in each
iteration. A more detailed explanation about the usage of β
is given in Sections III and V. Si denotes the output received
by user Ui. Depending on the users’ requirements, Si can
be the the global cluster centers and/or the final cluster IDs
corresponding to the data records of Ui. In this paper, we
consider the former case under which Si’s are the same for all
users (however, our protocol can be easily modified to handle
the latter case). In general, a PPODC protocol should meet the
following requirements:
• Data Confidentiality: The contents of Ui’s database Ti
should never be revealed to other users, C1 and C2.
• Accuracy: The output received by each party (i.e., Si’s )
should be the same as in the standard k-means algorithm.
• No Participation of Users: Since the very purpose of
outsourcing is to shift the users’ load towards the cloud
environment, a desirable requirement for any outsourced
task is that the computations should be totally performed
in the cloud. In particular to PPODC, the total clustering
process should be done by the cloud service providers.
This will enable the users who do not have enough
resources to participate in the clustering task to still get
the desired results without compromising privacy.
In certain cases, the user’s data (encrypted using his/her own
secret key) may have already been stored in a cloud (either
C1 or different cloud) and he/she want to use this data, along
with the data from other users, in the clustering task. In the
case of the data being stored on a different cloud (say C3), the
user has to first download and decrypt the data and re-encrypt
it under pk and send the resulting database to C1. This might
incur heavy cost on the user side, especially if the data is
large. However, we can address this issue using the proxy re-
encryption techniques (e.g., [22], [23]) as follows. (i) C3 can
directly send the encrypted data of the user to C1, (ii) the
user sends a proxy-re-encryption key corresponding to his/her
secret key and pk to C1, and (iii) C1 transforms the encrypted
data under the user’s public key domain into the domain of pk
without ever decrypting it using the proxy re-encryption key.
For ease of presentation, we do not consider the above case in
the rest of the paper. Instead, we simply assume that all users
hold their respective databases which they can encrypt under
pk and outsource them to C1.
B. Main Contributions
The problem of privacy-preserving clustering over en-
crypted data in an outsourced environment was addressed only
recently [24]. However, the existing method is proposed under
a single user setting. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no existing work that addresses the PPODC problem (i.e.,
under the multi-user setting). In this paper, we propose an
efficient and novel PPODC protocol that can enable a group of
users to outsource their encrypted data as well as the k-means
clustering task completely to a federated cloud environment
and ours is the first work along this direction. The main
contributions of this work are four-fold:
• We propose new transformations and develop an order-
preserving Euclidean distance function that enables the
proposed PPODC protocol to securely assign the data
records to the closest clusters, a crucial step in each
iteration of the k-means clustering algorithm. Also, we
propose a novel transformation for the termination condi-
tion that enables the PPODC protocol to securely evaluate
the termination condition over encrypted data.
• The proposed solution satisfies all the desirable properties
of PPODC mentioned in the previous sub-section. That
is, it protects the confidentiality of each user’s data at all
times and outputs the correct result. Also, once the user’s
data is outsourced to the cloud, the user does not need to
participate in any computations of the clustering task.
• We show that the proposed protocol is secure under the
standard semi-honest model [18]. Also, we theoretically
analyze the complexities of the proposed protocol.
• We demonstrate the practical applicability of our solution
through extensive experiments using a real-world dataset.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the existing related work. Section III presents
some definitions and properties related to k-means clustering
algorithm and the Paillier cryptosystem as a background.
Section IV presents our new transformation techniques. Sec-
tion V discusses our proposed PPODC solution in detail.
Also, within this section, we analyze the security guarantees
and complexities of our solution. Section VI presents our
experimental results on a real-world dataset under different
parameter settings. Finally, we conclude the paper along with
the scope for future research in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)
Our work is closely related to the field of privacy-preserving
data mining (PPDM) [25], [26]. Several techniques have been
proposed for the clustering task under the PPDM model (e.g.,
[9]–[12]). However, we stress that our problem setting is
somewhat different from the PPDM model. On one hand,
under PPDM, each user owns a piece of dataset (typically
a vertically or horizontally partitioned dataset) and the goal
is for them to collaboratively perform the clustering task on
the combined data in a privacy-preserving manner. On the
other hand, our work is motivated by the cloud computing
model where users can outsource their encrypted databases
to a federated cloud environment. Under our problem setting,
the federated cloud performs the clustering task over encrypted
data and the users do not participate in any of the underlying
computations. As a result, existing PPDM techniques for the
clustering task are not applicable to the PPODC problem.
Only recently, researchers have started to focus on the
clustering task in an outsourced environment (e.g., [24], [27]).
The work by Liu et al. [24] is perhaps the most recent work
along this direction. However, their solution has the following
limitations: (i) it assumes that there is only a single user
who wants to perform the clustering task on his/her own data
and (ii) the user is required to execute certain intermediate
computations and thus he/she needs to be part of the clustering
process. Unlike the work in [24], our solution is proposed
under the multi-user setting and the users can completely
outsource the computations of the clustering task to a federated
cloud environment in a privacy-preserving manner.
B. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
A straightforward way to solve the PPODC problem is
for the users to encrypt their data using a fully homomor-
phic encryption (FHE) scheme, e.g., [13], and outsource the
encrypted data to a cloud. Here the secret key should be
known only to the users (or shared among them). Since FHE
allows one to perform arbitrary computations over encrypted
data without decrypting the data, the cloud can perform the
clustering task over encrypted data and return the encrypted
clustering results to the users who can decrypt them. Though
the FHE schemes enable arbitrary searches or operations over
encrypted data, such techniques are very expensive and their
usage in practical applications is decades away. For example, it
was shown in [14] that even for weak security parameters one
“bootstrapping” operation of a homomorphic operation would
take at least 30 seconds on a high performance machine.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce definitions related to
cluster centers and computation of Euclidean distance between
a data record and given cluster. Then, we briefly discuss the
steps involved in the traditional k-means clustering algorithm.
Finally, we review upon the properties of the threshold Paillier
cryptosystem that is adopted in this paper.
A. Cluster Center
Definition 1: Let c = {t1, . . . , th} be a cluster where
t1, . . . , th are data records with l attributes. Then, the center
of cluster c is defined as a vector µc given by [12]:
µc[s] =
t1[s] + · · · + th[s]
|c|
=
λc[s]
|c|
, for 1 ≤ s ≤ l (2)
where ti[s] denotes the sth attribute value of ti and λc[s]
denotes the sum of sth attribute values of all the data records
in cluster c, for 1 ≤ i ≤ h. Also, |c| denotes the number of
data records in c.
In the above definition, the sth attribute value in µc is
equivalent to the mean of the sth attribute values of all the
data records in cluster c. Note that, if the cluster contains a
single data record, then the cluster center is the same as the
corresponding data record.
Example 1: Let c be a cluster with three data records
{t1, t2, t3}. Without loss of generality, suppose the data
records are given as below (assuming l = 5):
t1 = {0, 2, 1, 0, 3}
t2 = {1, 1, 3, 4, 2}
t3 = {0, 1, 0, 2, 0}
Then, the center of cluster c, based on Definition 1, is given
by µc[1] = 0.333, µc[2] = 1.333, µc[3] = 1.333, µc[4] = 2,
µc[5] = 1.666. 
B. Computation of Euclidean Distance between ti and c
We now discuss how to compute the similarity score be-
tween a given data record ti and a cluster c. In general, the
similarity score between any two objects can be computed
using one of the standard similarity metrics, such as Euclidean
distance, Cosine similarity, and Jaccard coefficient. In this pa-
per, we use the Euclidean distance as the underlying similarity
metric since the standard k-means algorithm is based on this
metric [12], [24].
Definition 2: For any given data record ti and cluster c, let
µc denote the cluster center of c (as per Definition 1). Then
the Euclidean distance between ti and c is given as
‖ti − c‖ =
√
l∑
s=1
(ti[s]− µc[s])
2
=
√
l∑
s=1
(
ti[s]−
λc[s]
|c|
)2
Example 2: Suppose ti and µc are as given below.
ti = {0, 1, 1, 3, 2}
µc = {0.333, 1.333, 1.333, 2, 1.666}
Then, the Euclidean distance between ti and c, based on
Definition 2, is ‖ti − c‖ = 1.201. 
In a similar manner, the Euclidean distance between any two
given clusters c and c′ can be computed using their respective
cluster centers. More specifically, ‖c− c′‖ is given as√√√√ l∑
s=1
(µc[s]− µc′ [s])
2
=
√√√√ l∑
s=1
(
λc[s]
|c|
−
λc′ [s]
|c′|
)2
where µc and µc′ denote the cluster centers of c and c′,
respectively. Also, |c| and |c′| denote the number of data
records in c and c′, respectively.
C. Single Party k-Means Clustering
Consider a user U who wants to apply the k-means clus-
tering algorithm [15], [16] on his/her own database of m
records, denoted by {t1, . . . , tm}. Here we assume that U
wants to compute k cluster centers, denoted by µc′
1
, . . . , µc′
k
,
as the output. However, other desired values, such as the
final cluster IDs assigned to each data record can also be
part of the output. Since k-means clustering is an iterative
algorithm, U has to input a threshold value to decide when
to stop the algorithm (termination condition). Without loss of
generality, let β denote the threshold value. Throughout this
paper, we assume that the initial set of k clusters are chosen
at random (referred to as the Initialization step). Note that
other techniques exist for choosing the initial clusters [12].
However, since the goal of this paper is not to investigate
which initialization technique is better, we simply assume that
they are selected at random.
The main steps involved in the traditional (single party) k-
means clustering task [15], [16], using the Euclidean distance
as the similarity metric, are given in Algorithm 1. Apart from
the initialization step, the algorithm involves three main stages:
(i) Assignment (ii) Update and (ii) Termination. First of all,
during the initialization step, k data records are selected at
random and assigned as the initial clusters c1, . . . , ck with
their centers (or mean vectors) denoted by µc1 , . . . , µck , re-
spectively. In the assignment stage, for each data record ti,
the algorithm computes the Euclidean distance between ti and
each cluster cj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Then, the algorithm identifies
the cluster corresponding to the minimum distance as the
closest cluster to ti (say ch) and assigns ti to a new cluster c′h,
where h ∈ [1, k]. In the update stage, the algorithm computes
the centers of the new clusters, denoted by µc′
1
, . . . , µc′
k
.
Finally, in the termination stage, the algorithm verifies whether
a pre-defined termination condition holds. More specifically,
the algorithm checks whether the sum of the squared Euclidean
distances between the current and newly computed clusters is
less than or equal to the threshold value β. If the termination
condition holds, then the algorithm halts and returns the new
cluster centers as the final output. Otherwise, the algorithm
continues to the next iteration with the new clusters as input.
D. The Paillier Cryptosystem
In this paper, we assume that the second cloud service
provider C2 generates a public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based
on the widely used Paillier cryptosystem [19] which consists
of an additively homomorphic and probabilistic encryption
scheme. Without loss of generality, let Epk(·) and Dsk(·)
denote the encryption and decryption functions under Paillier
cryptosystem and N denote the RSA modulus (or a part of the
public key pk). We emphasize that the Paillier cryptosystem
exhibits the following properties [19]:
Algorithm 1 k-means({t1, . . . , tm}, β)→ {µc′
1
, . . . , µc′
k
}
Require: User U with m data records {t1, . . . , tm} and β
Initialization: Select k data records at random and assign
them as initial clusters c1, . . . , ck with respective cluster
centers as µc1 , . . . , µck
1: for j = 1 to k do
2: c′j ← ∅
3: µc′
j
← {}
4: sum← 0
5: end for
{Assignment Stage}
6: for i = 1 to m do
7: for j = 1 to k do
8: Compute ‖ti − cj‖
9: end for
10: Add ti to cluster c′h such that ‖ti−ch‖ is the minimum,
for 1 ≤ h ≤ k
11: end for
{Update Stage}
12: for j = 1 to k do
13: Compute cluster center for c′j and assign it to µc′j
14: end for
{Termination Stage - Compare the old clusters (cj’s)
with new clusters (c′j’s) and check whether they are close
enough}
15: sum←
k∑
j=1
‖cj − c
′
j‖
2
16: if sum ≤ β then
17: Return {µc′
1
, . . . , µc′
k
}
18: else
19: for j = 1 to k do
20: cj ← c′j
21: µcj ← µc′j
22: end for
23: Go to Step 6
24: end if
• For any a, b ∈ ZN , the encryption scheme is additively
homomorphic: Epk(a) ∗ Epk(b) mod N2 = Epk(a +
b mod N). Due to this addition property, the encryp-
tion scheme also satisfies the multiplication property
Epk(a)
u mod N2 = Epk(a∗u mod N), where u ∈ ZN .
• The encryption scheme is semantically secure [28]. That
is, given a set of ciphertexts, a computationally bounded
adversary cannot deduce any information regarding the
corresponding plaintexts in polynomial time.
For ease of presentation, we omit the term mod N2 from
homomorphic operations in the rest of the paper. Also, as
mentioned in Section I-A, our proposed protocol can be easily
extended to the threshold Paillier setting [20] under which sk
is obliviously generated and shared between C1 and C2 [21].
IV. THE PROPOSED TRANSFORMATIONS
It is important to note that cluster centers (denoted by µc
for a cluster c) are represented as vectors and the entries in the
vectors can be fractional values. Since the encryption schemes
typically support integer values, we should somehow transform
the entries of the cluster centers into integer values without
affecting their utility in the k-means clustering process. Along
this direction, we first define scaling factors for clusters
and then discuss a novel order-preserving Euclidean distance
function operating over integers. Also, we discuss how to
transform the termination condition in the k-means clustering
algorithm with fractional values into an integer-valued one.
Definition 3: Consider the cluster ci whose center is de-
noted by µci (based on Definition 1). We know that µci
is a vector and each entry can be a fractional value with
denominator |ci|, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define the scaling factor
for a cluster ci, denoted by αi, as below:
αi =
k∏
j=1
|cj |
|ci|
=
k∏
j=1∧j 6=i
|cj | (3)
Also, we define α =
k∏
j=1
|cj | as the global scaling factor.
A. Order-Preserving Euclidean Distance (OPED)
In the assignment stage of k-means clustering, the first
step is to compute the Euclidean distance between a data
record ti and each cluster cj , denoted by ‖ti − cj‖ =√
l∑
s=1
(
ti[s]−
λcj [s]
|cj|
)2
. It is clear that ‖ti − cj‖ involves
fractional value λcj [s]|cj| . In order to compute the encrypted value
of ‖ti − cj‖, we need to avoid such fractional values without
affecting the relative ordering among the k Euclidean distances
‖ti − c1‖, . . . , ‖ti − ck‖, where c1, . . . , ck denote k clusters.
Note that since ti has to be assigned to the nearest cluster,
it is important to preserve the relative ordering among the
computed k Euclidean distances. For this purpose, we propose
a novel order-preserving Euclidean distance function which
works on only integer values.
We define the order-preserving Euclidean distance (OPED)
function between a data record ti and a cluster cj as follows:
OPED(ti, cj) =
√√√√ l∑
s=1
(
α ∗ ti[s]− αj ∗ λcj [s]
)2 (4)
where α and αj denote the global and cj’s scaling factors,
respectively. Observe that all the terms in the above equation
are integer values. Moreover, following from Definition 3, we
can rewrite the above equation as:
OPED(ti, cj) =
√√√√ l∑
s=1
(
α ∗ ti[s]−
α
|cj |
∗ λcj [s]
)2
=
√√√√α2 ∗
(
l∑
s=1
(
ti[s]−
λcj [s]
|cj |
)2)
= α ∗
√√√√ l∑
s=1
(
ti[s]−
λcj [s]
|cj |
)2
= α ∗ ‖ti − cj‖
Since α remains constant for any given set of k clusters (in a
particular iteration), we claim that the above OPED function
preserves the relative ordering among cluster centers for any
given data record. More specifically, given a data record ti
and two clusters cj and cj′ , if ‖ti − cj‖ ≥ ‖ti − cj′‖, then
it is guaranteed that OPED(ti, cj) ≥ OPED(ti, cj′), for 1 ≤
j, j′ ≤ k and j 6= j′.
B. Transformation of the Termination Condition
In the k-means clustering process (see Algorithm 1), the
termination condition is given by:
k∑
j=1
‖cj − c
′
j‖
2 ≤ β (5)
where c1, . . . , ck and c′1, . . . , c′k denote the current and new
set of clusters in an iteration, respectively. Remember that
‖cj − c′j‖ =
√
l∑
s=1
(
λcj [s]
|cj|
−
λc′
j
[s]
|c′
j
|
)2
and clearly it consists
of fractional values. In order to evaluate this condition over
encryption, we first need to transform the above termination
condition so that all the components are integers. To achieve
this, we use the following approach. We define a constant
scaling factor (denoted by f ) for the termination condition
in such a way that by multiplying Equation 5 with f2, we
can cancel all the denominator values. More specifically, we
define the scaling factor for the termination condition as
f =
k∏
j=1
|cj | ∗ |c′j |. Also, we define the scaling factor for the
cluster pair (cj , c′j) as fj =
f
|cj|∗|c′j|
=
k∏
i=1∧i6=j
|ci| ∗ |c
′
i|. Then
we define the new termination condition as follows:
k∑
j=1
l∑
s=1
(
|c′j | ∗ fj ∗ λcj [s]− |cj | ∗ fj ∗ λc′j [s]
)2
≤ f2∗β (6)
Observe that the above equation consists of only integer val-
ues. Now we need to show that evaluating the above equation
is the same as evaluating Equation 5. First, we divide the
above equation by f2 on both sides of the inequality. Note that
since f2 remains constant in a given iteration, multiplication
of Equation 6 by f2 has no effect on the inequality. Precisely,
Equation 6 can be rewritten as:
k∑
j=1
l∑
s=1
(
|c′j | ∗ fj ∗ λcj [s]− |cj | ∗ fj ∗ λc′j [s]
)2
f2
≤ β
Given this, the left-hand side of the above equation can be
expanded as follows:
k∑
j=1
l∑
s=1
(
|c′j| ∗ fj ∗ λcj [s]
f
−
|cj | ∗ fj ∗ λc′
j
[s]
f
)2
=
k∑
j=1
l∑
s=1
(
|c′j | ∗ λcj [s]
|cj | ∗ |c′j |
−
|cj | ∗ λc′
j
[s]
|cj | ∗ |c′j |
)2
=
k∑
j=1
l∑
s=1
(
λcj [s]
|cj |
−
λc′
j
[s]
|c′j |
)2
=
k∑
j=1
‖cj − c
′
j‖
2
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that evaluating the
inequality
∑k
j=1 ‖cj − c
′
j‖
2 ≤ β is the same as evaluating
Equation 6. Hence, in our proposed PPODC protocol, we
consider Equation 6 as the termination condition of k-means
clustering and evaluate it in a privacy-preserving manner.
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we first discuss a set of privacy-preserving
primitives. Then, we present our novel PPODC protocol that
utilizes the above transformation techniques and the privacy-
preserving primitives as building blocks.
As mentioned in Section I-A, in this paper we consider two
semi-honest and non-colluding cloud service providers C1 and
C2 under the Paillier cryptosystem [19]. More specifically, C2
generates a pair of public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based on
the Paillier’s scheme such that sk is kept private whereas the
corresponding public key pk is broadcasted.
A. Privacy-Preserving Primitives
We discuss a set of privacy-preserving primitives under the
above two-party (i.e., C1 and C2) computation model.
• Secure Multiplication (SMP): Given that C1 holds
〈Epk(a), Epk(b)〉 and C2 holds sk, where 〈a, b〉 is un-
known to both C1 and C2, the goal of the SMP protocol
is to compute Epk(a∗b). During the execution of SMP, no
information regarding the contents of a and b is revealed
to C1 and C2.
• Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED): In
this protocol, C1 holds two encrypted vectors
Epk(X) = 〈Epk(x[1], . . . , Epk(x[l])〉 and
Epk(Y ) = 〈Epk(y[1]), . . . , Epk(y[l])〉. The goal of
SSED is to compute the encryption of the squared
Euclidean distance between X and Y . Specifically, the
output is Epk((‖X − Y ‖)2). The SSED protocol should
reveal neither the contents of X and Y nor the Euclidean
distance between them to C1 and C2.
• Secure Squared Order-Preserving Euclidean Distance
(SSEDOP): Given that C1 holds an encrypted data record,
denoted by Epk(ti), and an encrypted cluster, denoted
by Epk(ch), the goal of the SSEDOP protocol is for
C1 and C2 to jointly compute Epk((OPED(ti, ch))2).
Here Epk(ch) = 〈Epk(λch), Epk(|ch|)〉 and Epk(λch ) =
〈Epk(λch [1]), . . . , Epk(λch [l])〉. Note that OPED(ti, ch)
denotes the Euclidean distance between ti and cluster ch
based on the order-preserving Euclidean distance function
defined in Equation 4. At the end of this protocol, the
output Epk((OPED(ti, ch))2) is revealed only to C1 and
no other information is revealed to C1 and C2.
• Secure Least Significant Bit (SLSB): Given that C1 holds
Epk(z), where z is unknown to both parties, the goal of
SLSB is to compute encryption of the least significant bit
(LSB) of z. The output Epk([z]1) is revealed only to C1,
where [z]1 denotes the LSB of z. During the execution
of the SLSB protocol, no contents regarding z is revealed
to C1 and C2.
• Secure Comparison (SC): Given that C1 holds
〈Epk(a), Epk(b)〉, the goal of SC is to securely
compare a and b. The output of SC is Epk(γ), where
γ = 1 if a ≤ b, and 0 otherwise. At the end, Epk(γ) is
known only to C1 and no other information is revealed
to C1 and C2.
• Secure Minimum (SMIN): Assume that C1 holds
〈Epk(a), Epk(sa)〉 and 〈Epk(b), Epk(sb)〉, where sa and
sb are the secrets associated with integers a and b,
respectively. The goal of SMIN is to compute the en-
cryption of minimum value between a and b, denoted by
Epk(min(a, b)). In addition, it computes the encryption
of the secret corresponding to the minimum value. More
specifically, the final output of SMIN is (T, I), and it will
be revealed only to C1. Here T = Epk(min(a, b)), and
I = Epk(sa) if a is the minimum value, and I = Epk(Sb)
otherwise. During SMIN, no information regarding a and
b is revealed to C1 and C2.
• Secure Minimum out of k Numbers (SMINk): In this
protocol, we assume that C1 holds k encrypted integers
and C2 holds sk. The goal of SMINk is to securely
identify the location corresponding to the minimum value
among the k numbers. More specifically, if jth integer
is the minimum number among the k values, then the
output of SMINk is an encrypted vector such that its jth
component is Epk(1) and the rest are encryptions of 0,
where j ∈ [1, k]. The SMINk protocol should not reveal
any information regarding the contents of k numbers
(e.g., the minimum value or the location corresponding
to it, etc.) to C1 and C2. The SMINk protocol can be
treated as a generalization of SMIN in which the secrets
associated with the k integers represent their locations.
Several solutions have been proposed for most of the above
privacy-preserving primitives. Recently, Yousef et al. [29] dis-
cussed efficient implementations for SMP and SSED. Also, an
efficient solution to SLSB was proposed in [30]. In the rest of
Algorithm 2 SSEDOP(Epk(ti), Epk(ch))
Require: C1 has Epk(ti), Epk(ch) = 〈Epk(λch), Epk(|ch|)〉
1: C1 and C2:
(a). bh ← SMPk−1(τh), where τh = ∪kj=1∧j 6=hEpk(|cj |)
(b). b′ ← SMP(bh, Epk(|ch|))
(c). for 1 ≤ s ≤ l do:
• ai[s]← SMP(b′, Epk(ti[s]))
• a′h[s]← SMP(bh, Epk(λch [s]))
(d). Epk((OPED(ti, ch))2)← SSED(ai, a′h)
this paper, SMP and SSED refer to the implementations given
in [29]. Similarly, by SLSB, we refer to the implementation
given in [30]. We now propose efficient implementations to
SSEDOP, SC, SMIN, and SMINk.
1) The SSEDOP Protocol: We discuss a novel solution
to the SSEDOP problem using the SMP and SSED pro-
tocols as sub-routines. The main steps involved in the
proposed SSEDOP protocol are highlighted in Algorithm
2. We assume that C1 holds 〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(ck)〉 and
C2 holds sk, where c1, . . . , ck denote k clusters and
Epk(ch) = 〈Epk(λch), Epk(|ch|)〉. Note that Epk(λch) =
〈Epk(λch [1]), . . . , Epk(λch [l])〉. The goal of SSEDOP is to
securely compute Epk((OPED(ti, ch))2) for a given input
Epk(ti) and Epk(ch), where 1 ≤ h ≤ k.
To start with, C1 and C2 securely compute the scaling
factor for cluster ch (in encrypted format based on Equation
3) using the extended secure multiplication protocol, denoted
by SMPk−1, that takes k − 1 encrypted inputs and multiplies
them (within encryption). Specifically, they jointly compute
bh = SMPk−1(τh), where τh = ∪kj=1∧j 6=hEpk(|cj |). The im-
portant observation here is that bh = Epk(
∏k
j=1∧j 6=h |cj |) =
Epk(αh), where αh is the scaling factor for cluster ch as
defined in Equation 3. Then C1 and C2 securely multiply bh
with Epk(|ch|) using SMP to get b′ = SMP(bh, Epk(ch)) =
Epk(|c1| ∗ . . . ∗ |ck|) = Epk(α), where α is the global scaling
factor. After this, for 1 ≤ s ≤ l, C1 and C2 jointly compute
two encrypted vectors as follows:
ai[s] = SMP(b′, Epk(ti[s])) = Epk(α ∗ ti[s])
a′h[s] = SMP(bh, Epk(λch [s])) = Epk(αh ∗ λch [s])
Finally, with the two encrypted vectors ai and a′h as C1’s input,
C1 and C2 jointly compute the encrypted squared Euclidean
distance between them using the SSED protocol. More specif-
ically, the output of SSED(ai, a′h) is Epk(
∑l
s=1(α ∗ ti[s] −
αh ∗ λch [s])
2). Following from Equation 4, it is clear that the
output SSED(ai, a′h) is equivalent to Epk((OPED(ti, ch))2).
2) The Secure Comparison (SC) Protocol: Given that C1
holds 〈Epk(a), Epk(b)〉 and C2 holds sk, the goal of SC is to
return Epk(γ) such that γ = 1 iff a ≤ b, and γ = 0 otherwise.
During SC, neither the contents of (a, b) nor the comparison
result γ should be disclosed to C1 and C2.
We emphasize that it is desirable to have an SC protocol
whose efficiency does not rely on the bit length of the input
integers (i.e., a and b) to be compared. We now discuss about
such a solution constructed by combining SLSB [30] with
TABLE I
TRUTH TABLE FOR a ≤ b
w = (a < N/2) x = (b < N/2) y = (b − a mod N < N/2) γ = (a ≤ b)
0 1 * 0
1 0 * 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
the ideas proposed by Nishide et al. [31]. The SC solution
proposed in [31] is based on the secret sharing scheme [32].
However, it is also applicable to our problem domain upon
simple modifications.
In what follows, we briefly describe how C1 and C2 can se-
curely compute the encryption of γ, given 〈Epk(a), Epk(b)〉 as
C1’s private input, using the ideas proposed in [31]. According
to [31], the value of comparison result γ solely depends on
the following 3 predicates: w : a < N/2, x : b < N/2, and
y : b− a mod N < N/2. More specifically, γ is given as:
γ = wx ∨ w xy ∨ wxy
= w(1 − x) ∨ (1− w)(1 − x)y ∨wxy
= −x(w + y − 2wy) + (w + y − wy) (7)
More specifically, all possible combinations of (w, x, y) and
their corresponding γ values are given in Table I, where ∗
denotes either bit 0 or 1. The main challenge here is that how
C1 can compute Epk(w), Epk(x) and Epk(y) given Epk(a)
and Epk(b).
As highlighted in [31], one can notice that a ∈
{0, 1, · · · , (N−1)2 } iff [2a mod N ]1 = 0. Similarly, a ∈
{ (N−1)2 + 1, · · · , N − 1} iff [2a mod N ]1 = 1, where [2a]1
signifies the least significant bit (LSB) of 2a mod N . That
is, w = 1 (implying that a < N/2) if and only if the LSB
of (2a mod N) is 0, i.e., w ⇔ 1 − [2a mod N ]1. Similar
conclusions can be drawn for x and y. Consider the case
of computing Epk(w) from Epk(a). First, C1 can locally
compute Epk(2a). Then, in order to compute the encrypted
LSB of 2a, C1 and C2 jointly involve in the SLSB protocol
[30]. At the end of this step, only C1 knows Epk([2a]1). Now
C1 can locally compute Epk(w) = Epk(1)∗Epk([2a]1)N−1 =
Epk(1− [2a]1). In a similar fashion, C1 can compute Epk(x)
and Epk(y). Finally, C1 (with the help of C2) can compute
Epk(γ) based on Equation 7. Note that this step explicitly
requires SMP as a building block.
3) The SMIN Protocol: Let a and b be two integers in ZN ,
and sa and sb be their associated secrets, respectively. For
example, if a and b correspond to two data records, then their
secrets can correspond to the record identifiers. Suppose that
min(a, b) denote the minimum value between a and b and
that smin(a,b) denote the secret corresponding to min(a, b).
Given that 〈Epk(a), Epk(sa)〉 and 〈Epk(b), Epk(sb)〉 as C1’s
private input, the goal of SMIN is to securely compute
〈Epk(min(a, b)), Epk(smin(a,b))〉 as the final output and it
should be known only to C1.
We now discuss a simple to SMIN based on the SC
protocol. As discussed above, at the end of SC protocol, C1
knows Epk(γ), where γ denotes the comparison result of
functionality a ≤ b. Given Epk(γ), C1 can securely compute
the encryption of the minimum value between a and b, i.e.,
Epk(min(a, b)), using the following formulation:
min(a, b) = γ ∗ a+ (1− γ) ∗ b
More specifically, using the secure multiplication (SMP) pro-
tocol, C1 with input 〈Epk(a), Epk(b), Epk(γ)〉 and C2 with sk
can compute Epk(γ ∗ a) and Epk(γ ∗ b). Note that the output
of SMP will be known only to C1. After this, C1 can compute
Epk(min(a, b)) as Epk(γ ∗a)∗Epk(b)∗Epk(γ ∗b)N−1 locally.
In a similar manner, apart from the encrypted minimum
value, C1 and C2 compute the encryption of the secret
associated with the minimum value. More specifically, they
compute Epk(smin(a,b)) using the following formulation:
smin(a,b) = γ ∗ sa + (1− γ) ∗ sb
Example 3: Suppose C1 holds Epk(7) and Epk(4) (i.e., a =
7 and b = 4). Without loss of generality, let Epk(s1) and
Epk(s2) denote their respective secrets. It is clear that the SC
protocol returns Epk(0) (i.e., γ = 0) as output to C1 since
a ≤ b does not hold in this example. The output of SMIN is
Epk(min(7, 4)) = Epk(γ ∗a+(1−γ)∗b) = Epk(b) = Epk(4)
and Epk(smin(a,b)) = Epk(s2). 
4) The SMINk Protocol: Given k encrypted integers, the
SMINk protocol computes an encrypted vector Γ of length k
such that the entry corresponding to the minimum value is an
encryption of 1 and the rest are encryptions of 0. We now
discuss a novel SMINk protocol constructed using the SMIN
protocol as a building block. The overall steps in the proposed
SMINk protocol are give in Algorithm 3.
Suppose Epk(d1), . . . , Epk(dk) denote the list of k en-
crypted integers and i denotes the index (or location) of integer
di in the list, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Initially, using the SMIN proto-
col, C1 with input (Epk(d1), Epk(1)) and (Epk(d2), Epk(2))
and C2 can compute T = Epk(min(d1, d2)) and I =
Epk(smin(d1,d2)), where smin(d1,d2) denotes the location of
the minimum value between d1 and d2. Note that the out-
put of the SMIN protocol is known only to C1. After this
Algorithm 3 SMINk(Epk(d1), . . . , Epk(dk))→ Γ
Require: C1 holds (Epk(d1), . . . , Epk(dk)) and pi; C2 holds
sk.
1: C1 and C2:
(a). (T, I)← SMIN((Epk(d1), Epk(1)), (Epk(d2), Epk(2)))
(b). for i = 2 to k − 1 do:
• (T, I)← SMIN((T, I), (Epk(ds+1), Epk(s+ 1)))
2: C1:
(a). ∆← IN−1
(b). for i = 1 to k do:
• ∆′[i]← Epk(i) ∗∆
• φ[i]← ∆′[i]ri , where ri ∈R ZN
(c). u← pi(φ); send φ to C2
3: C2:
(a). Receive u from C1
(b). for i = 1 to k do:
• u′[i]← Dsk(u[i])
(c). for i = 1 to k do:
• if u′[i] = 0 then U [i]← Epk(1)
• else U [i]← Epk(0)
(d). Send U to C1
4: C1:
(a). Receive U from C2
(b). Γ← pi−1(U)
C1 with input (T, I) and (Epk(d3), Epk(3)) can compute
Epk(min(d1, d2, d3)) and Epk(smin(d1,d2,d3)) using SMIN.
The above process is repeated until I = Epk(smin(d1,...,dk))
is computed (known only to C1), where smin(d1,...,dk) denotes
the index (or location) corresponding to the minimum value
among the k input values. This process is shown as Step 1 in
Algorithm 3.
After this, C1 and C2 perform the following set of opera-
tions:
• C1 computes Epk(i−smin(d1,...,dk)) and randomizes it to
get φ[i] = Epk(ri ∗ (i−smin(d1,...,dk))), where ri denotes
a random number in ZN and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Observe that
exactly one of the entries in φ is equal to encryption of 0
(i.e., when i = smin(d1,...,dk)) and the rest are encryptions
of random values. Hereafter, we use the notation r ∈R
ZN to denote a random number r in ZN .
• C1 computes u = pi(φ) and sends it to C2. Here pi is a
random permutation function known only to C1.
• Upon receiving u, C2 decrypts it component-wise using
sk to get u′[i] = Dsk(u[i]). After this, C2 generates an
encrypted vector U as follows. If u′[i] = 0, then U [i] =
Epk(1), and Epk(0) otherwise. C2 sends U to C1.
• Finally, C1 gets the desired encrypted vector Γ as output
by performing an inverse permutation on U .
Example 4: Let k = 5 and the input to SMINk be
〈Epk(3), Epk(6), Epk(13), Epk(2), Epk(9)〉. The output at the
end of Step 1 in the proposed SMINk protocol is 〈T, I〉 =
〈Epk(2), Epk(4)〉 and it will be known only to C1. Note
that since ‘2’ is the minimum among the five input values,
the output of Step 1 is encryption of ‘2’ and encryption
of the location corresponding to ‘2’ in the input list (i.e.,
smin(3,6,13,2,9) = 4). After this, C1 computes φ[1] = Epk(r1 ∗
(1− 4)), φ[2] = Epk(r2 ∗ (2− 4)), φ[3] = Epk(r3 ∗ (3− 4)),
φ[4] = Epk(r4 ∗ (4 − 4)), and φ[5] = Epk(r5 ∗ (5 − 4)).
Without loss of generality, let the random permutation function
pi (known only to C1) be as follows. Now C1 computes u =
i = 1 2 3 4 5
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
pi(i) = 2 5 1 3 4
pi(φ) = 〈φ[3], φ[1], φ[4], φ[5], φ[2]〉 and sends the resulting
vector u to C2. Upon receiving, C2 decrypts it using sk
and identifies that Dsk(u[3]) = 0. Note that the rest of
the values are random numbers. Then C2 computes U =
〈Epk(0), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(0)〉 and sends it to C1.
Finally, C1 computes the final output as Γ = pi−1(U) =
〈Epk(0), Epk(0), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(0)〉. 
B. The Proposed PPODC Protocol
In this sub-section, we discuss our proposed PPODC pro-
tocol which is based on the standard k-means algorithm
discussed in Section III-C. As mentioned in Section I-A, our
system model consists of n users denoted by U1, . . . , Un.
User Uj holds a database Tj of mj data records with l
attributes, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Without loss of generality, let the
aggregated database be T =
⋃n
j=1 Tj = {t1, . . . , tm}, where
m =
∑n
j=1mj denotes the total number of records in T .
For simplicity, let t1 . . . tm1 belong to U1, tm1+1, . . . , tm1+m2
belong to U2, and so on. We assume that all users agree upon
using two cloud service providers C1 and C2 for outsourcing
their respective databases as well as the k-means clustering
task. Remember that, in our system model, C2 generates a
public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based on the Paillier cryptosys-
tem [19] and the public key pk is sent to all users and C1.
After the users outsource their data (encrypted under pk)
to C1, the goal of PPODC is to enable C1 and C2 to
jointly compute the global cluster centers using the aggregated
encrypted data in a privacy-preserving manner. At a high level,
our protocol computes the global cluster centers in an iterative
manner until the pre-defined termination condition (given in
Equation 6) holds.
The overall steps involved in the proposed PPODC protocol
are given in Algorithms 4 and 5. The main steps are shown
in Algorithm 4. Briefly, the PPODC protocol consists of the
following three stages:
• Stage 1 - Secure Data Outsourcing:
During this stage, each user Uj has to securely outsource
an encrypted version of his/her database Tj to C1. To
minimize the data encryption costs of users, we achieve
data outsourcing through randomization techniques. Note
that this stage is run only once. At the end of this stage,
only C1 knows the (attribute-wise) encryptions of the n
databases.
• Stage 2 - Secure Computation of New Clusters:
In this stage, C1 initially selects k data records at random
(from the aggregated encrypted records) and assigns them
as initial clusters (this step is the same as the initialization
step in the traditional k-means algorithm). Then, C1 and
C2 jointly assign each data record to a new cluster. After
this, they compute the new cluster centers in encrypted
format. The main goal of this stage is similar to the
assignment and update stages given in Algorithm 1.
• Stage 3 - Secure Termination or Update:
Upon computing the new cluster centers (in encrypted
format),C1 and C2 securely verify whether the sum of the
squared Euclidean distances between the current and new
clusters is less than or equal to β (termination condition
based on Equation 6). Here β denotes the pre-defined
threshold value agreed upon by all the participating users.
If the termination condition holds, then the protocol
terminates returning the new cluster centers as the final
output. Otherwise, C1 and C2 update the current clusters
to the new clusters and repeat Stages 2 and 3.
We emphasize that Stage 1 of PPODC is executed only once
whereas Stages 2 and 3 are run in an iterative manner. We
now discuss the steps in each of these three stages in detail.
1) Stage 1 - Secure Data Outsourcing (SDO): Data are
typically encrypted before being outsourced for privacy rea-
sons. However, to avoid computation overhead on the users
side due to having to encrypt their data, we consider the
following approach for data outsourcing. User Uj generates
two random shares for each attribute value of his/her data
record ti. Precisely, for the sth attribute of data record ti, Uj
generates two random shares (t1i [s], t2i [s]) given by t1i [s] =
ti[s]+ri[s] mod N and t2i [s] = N−ri[s], where ri[s] ∈R ZN
and 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Observe that ti[s] = t1i [s] + t2i [s] mod N . Uj
outsources the random shares t1i [s] and t2i [s] to C1 and C2,
respectively, instead of encrypting the database attribute-wise
and outsourcing it to C1. Thus, we are able to avoid heavy
encryption costs on the users during the data outsourcing
step. Here we assume that there exist secure communication
channels, which can be established using standard mechanisms
such as SSL, between user Uj and the two clouds C1 and C2.
Each user Uj sends the random shares of his/her data to C1
and C2 separately through the secure communication channels.
After receiving the random shares for all the data records,
C2 computes Epk(t2i [s]) and sends it to C1. Then C1 computes
Epk(ti[s]) = Epk(t
1
i [s]) ∗ Epk(t
2
i [s]), for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ s ≤ l.
2) Stage 2 - Secure Computation of New Clusters (SCNC):
Given the (attribute-wise) encrypted versions of users data,
during Stage 2, C1 and C2 jointly compute the new cluster cen-
ters in a privacy-preserving manner. To start with, C1 randomly
selects k encrypted data records (from the aggregated data) and
assigns them as initial clusters. More specifically, the k en-
crypted data records are assigned to Epk(λc1), . . . , Epk(λck),
respectively. For example, if the 3rd data record is selected as
the first cluster c1, then Epk(λc1 [s]) is set to Epk(t3[s]), for
1 ≤ s ≤ l. Also, Epk(|ch|) is set to Epk(1) since each initial
Algorithm 4 PPODC(〈T1, . . . , Tn〉, β)→ (S1, . . . , Sn)
Require: Uj holds a private database Tj with mj data records,
sk is known only to C2
{Stage 1 - Secure Data Outsourcing}
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
(a). for 1 ≤ s ≤ l:
• if ti ∈ Tj then:
– Uj computes t1i [s] = ti[s] + ri[s] mod N ,
t2i [s] = N−ri[s], and ri[s] is a random number
in ZN ; sends t1i [s] to C1 and t2i [s] to C2
• C2 sends Epk(t2i [s]) to C1
• C1 computes Epk(ti[s])← Epk(t1i [s])∗Epk(t2i [s])
{Stage 2 - Secure Computation of New Clusters}
2: C1:
(a). Select k records at random and assign them to initial
clusters denoted by Epk(λc1), . . . , Epk(λck), where
c1, . . . , ck denote the current clusters
(b). Epk(|ch|)← Epk(1), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). C1 and C2:
• Epk(di[h])← SSEDOP(Epk(ti), Epk(ch)), for 1 ≤
h ≤ k, where Epk(ch) = 〈Epk(λch), Epk(|ch|)〉
• Γi ← SMINk(Epk(di[1]), . . . , Epk(di[k]))
• Λi,h[s] ← SMP(Γi,h, Epk(ti[s])), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k
and 1 ≤ s ≤ l
4: C1:
(a). for 1 ≤ h ≤ k do:
• Wh[s]←
m∏
i=1
Λi,h[s], for 1 ≤ s ≤ l
• Epk(|c′h|)←
m∏
i=1
Γi,h
{Stage 3 - Secure Termination or Update}
5: γ ← SETC(Ω,Ω′), where γ denotes whether
the termination condition holds or not, Ω =
{〈Epk(λc1), Epk(|c1|)〉 . . . , 〈Epk(λck), Epk(|ck|)〉}
and Ω′ = {〈W1, Epk(|c′1|)〉 . . . , 〈Wk, Epk(|c′k|)〉}
6: if γ = 1 then, for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l
(a). C1:
• Oh[s]←Wh[s]∗Epk(r′h[s]) and δh ← Epk(|c′h|)∗
Epk(r
′′
h), where r′h[s] and r′′h ∈R ZN
• Send Oh[s] and δh to C2; r′h[s] and r′′h to each
user Uj
(b). C2: Send O′h[s] ← Dsk(Oh[s]) and δ′h ← Dsk(δh)
to each user Uj
else, for 1 ≤ h ≤ s
• Epk(λch)←Wh and Epk(|ch|)← Epk(|c′h|)
• Go to Step 3
7: Uj , foreach received pairs 〈O′h, r′h) and 〈δ′h, r′′h〉 do:
(a). λc′
h
[s] = O′h[s]− r
′
h[s] mod N , 1 ≤ s ≤ l
(b). |c′h| ← δ′h − r′′h mod N
(c). µc′
h
[s]←
λc′
h
[s]
|c′
h
| and Sj ← Sj ∪ µc′h
cluster ch consists of only one data record, for 1 ≤ h ≤ k.
For each encrypted data record Epk(ti), C1 and C2 compute
the squared Euclidean distance between ti and all the clusters
based on the order-preserving Euclidean distance function
given in Equation 4. To achieve this, C1 and C2 jointly execute
the SSEDOP protocol with Epk(ti) and Epk(ch) as C1’s private
input, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ h ≤ k, where Epk(ch) =
〈Epk(λch), Epk(|ch|)〉. The output of SSEDOP is denoted by
Epk(di[h]). Note that di[h] = (OPED(ti, ch))2. Now, C1 and
C2 jointly execute the following set of operations:
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, with the k encrypted distances as C1’s
private input to the secure minimum out of k numbers
(SMINk) protocol, C1 and C2 compute an encrypted bit
vector Γi. The important observation here is that Γi,g is an
encryption of 1 iff di[g] is the minimum distance among
〈di[1], . . . , di[k]〉. In this case, ti is closest to cluster cg,
where 1 ≤ g ≤ k. The rest of the values in Γi are
encryptions of 0. Note that the output of SMINk, i.e.,
Γi, is known only to C1.
• After this, C1 and C2 securely multiply Γi,h
with Epk(ti[s]) using the secure multiplication
(SMP) sub-protocol. Precisely, C1 and C2 compute
Λi,h[s] = SMP(Γi,h, Epk(ti[s])). The observation here
is that since Γi,g = Epk(1) only if ti is closest to cluster
cg, Λi,g = Epk(ti) denoting that ti is assigned to new
cluster c′g. Also, Λi,h is a vector of encryptions of 0, for
1 ≤ h ≤ k and h 6= g.
Next, C1 computes the new cluster centers locally by perform-
ing homomorphic operations on Λi,h and Γi,h as follows:
• Compute (in encrypted format) the sth-component of the
numerator for the center of new cluster c′h as Wh[s] =
m∏
i=1
Λi,h[s], for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l. The observation
here is Wh[s] = Epk(λc′
h
[s]). Remember that µc′
h
[s] =
λc′
h
[s]
|c′
h
| , where µc′h denotes the center of cluster c
′
h.
• Compute the number of data records (in the encrypted
format) that belong to the new cluster c′h as Epk(|c′h|) =
m∏
i=1
Γi,h, for 1 ≤ h ≤ k.
3) Stage 3 - Secure Termination or Update (STOU):
Given the new clusters (in encrypted format) resulting from
Stage 2, the goal of Stage 3 is for C1 and C2 to verify
whether the termination condition (based on Equation 6) holds
in a privacy-preserving manner. If the termination condition
holds, the new cluster centers are returned as the final output
to each user. Otherwise, the entire iterative process (i.e.,
Stages 2 and 3) is repeated by using the new clusters as the
current clusters. The current and new clusters are given by
Ω = {〈Epk(λc1), Epk(|c1|)〉, . . . , 〈Epk(λck), Epk(|ck|)〉} and
Ω′ = {〈W1, Epk(|c′1|)〉 . . . , 〈Wk, Epk(|c
′
k|)〉}), respectively.
First, by using the current and new clusters, C1 and C2 need
to securely evaluate the termination condition (SETC) based
on Equation 6. The main steps involved in SETC are given in
Algorithm 5 which we explain in detail below:
• C1 and C2 compute τi = Epk(|ci| ∗ |c′i|) using
〈Epk(ci), Epk(c
′
i)〉 as C1’s private input to the SMP sub-
protocol, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The output τi is known only to
C1.
• By using τi’s, they compute Vi = SMPk−1(τ ′i ), where
τ ′i = ∪
k
j=1∧j 6=iτj . Here SMPk−1 denotes the SMP proto-
col with k − 1 encrypted inputs that need to be securely
multiplied. More specifically, Vi = Epk(
∏k
j=1∧j 6=i |ci| ∗
|c′i|), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The important observation here is
Vi = Epk

 k∏
j=1∧j 6=i
|ci| ∗ |c
′
i|

 = Epk(fi)
where fi is the scaling factor for cluster pair (ci, c′i)
defined in Section IV-B. Then, they compute an encrypted
value Zi as
Zi = SMP(Vi, Vi) = Epk(f2i )
• After this, they securely multiply V1 and τ1 using SMP
protocol. The output of this step is
V = SMP(V1, τ1) = Epk

 k∏
j=1
|cj | ∗ |c
′
j |

 = Epk(f)
where f is the scaling factor for the termination condition
as defined in Section IV-B. Then, they compute
Y = SMP(V, V ) = Epk(f2)
.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, C1 and C2 securely multiply each
component in the current and new clusters with |c′i| and
|ci|, respectively. More specifically, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
1 ≤ s ≤ l, they compute
Gi[s] = SMP(Epk(λci [s]), Epk(|c′i|))
= Epk(λci [s] ∗ |c
′
i|)
G′i[s] = SMP(Wi[s], Epk(|ci|))
= Epk(λc′
i
[s] ∗ |ci|)
Note that Wi[s] computed in Stage 2 is equivalent to
Epk(λc′
i
[s]).
• Now, by using the secure squared Euclidean distance
(SSED) protocol with input vectors Gi and G′i, C1 and
C2 jointly compute Hi = SSED(Gi, G′i). Precisely, they
compute the encryption of squared Euclidean distance
between vectors in Gi and G′i given by,
Hi = Epk
(
l∑
s=1
(λci [s] ∗ |c
′
i| − λc′i [s] ∗ |ci|)
2
)
• Given Zi and Hi, C1 and C2 can securely
multiply them to get H ′i = SMP(Hi, Zi) =
Epk
(
f2i ∗
∑l
s=1(λci [s] ∗ |c
′
i| − λc′i [s] ∗ |ci|)
2
)
Algorithm 5 SETC(Ω,Ω′)
Require: C1 has Ω = {〈Epk(λc1), Epk(|c1|)〉, . . . , 〈Epk(λck),
Epk(|ck|)〉}, Ω′ = {〈W1, Epk(|c′1|)〉 . . . , 〈Wk, Epk(|c
′
k|)〉}
1: C1 and C2:
(a). τi ← SMP(Epk(|ci|), Epk(|c′i|)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
(b). for 1 ≤ i ≤ k do:
• Vi ← SMPk−1(τ ′i), where τ ′i = ∪kj=1∧j 6=iτj
• Zi ← SMP(Vi, Vi)
(c). V ← SMP(V1, τ1)
(d). Y ← SMP(V, V )
(e). for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l do:
• Gi[s]← SMP(Epk(λci [s]), Epk(|c′i|))
• G′i[s]← SMP(Wi[s], Epk(|ci|))
(f). Hi ← SSED(Gi, G′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
(g). H ′i ← SMP(Hi, Zi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
2: C1: L←
k∏
i=1
H ′i and R← Y β
3: C1 and C2:
(a). Epk(γ) ← SC(L,R), note that the output of SC is
known only to C1
4: C1: Send Epk(γ) to C2
5: C2: Decrypt Epk(γ) and send γ to C1
At the end of the above process, C1 has Y = Epk(f2) and
H ′i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now C1 locally computes:
R = Y β = Epk(f
2 ∗ β) and
L =
k∏
i=1
H ′i
=
k∏
i=1
Epk
(
f2i ∗
l∑
s=1
(λci [s] ∗ |c
′
i| − λc′i [s] ∗ |ci|)
2
)
= Epk
(
k∑
i=1
l∑
s=1
(λci [s] ∗ fi ∗ |c
′
i| − λc′i [s] ∗ fi ∗ |ci|)
2
)
At this point, C1 has encryptions of the integers corresponding
to both the left-hand and right-hand sides of the termination
condition given in Equation 6. Therefore, the goal is to now
securely compare them using the secure comparison (SC)
protocol. More specifically, by using L and R as C1’s private
input to the SC protocol, C1 and C2 securely evaluate the
termination condition:
k∑
i=1
l∑
s=1
(
λci [s] ∗ fi ∗ |c
′
i| − λc′i [s] ∗ fi ∗ |ci|
)2
≤ f2 ∗ β
The output is Epk(γ) = SC(L,R), where γ = 1 iff the
termination condition holds, and γ = 0 otherwise. Note that
Epk(γ) is known only to C1. After this, C1 sends Epk(γ) to
C2, who decrypts it and forwards the value of γ to C1.
Finally, once the termination condition has been securely
evaluated, C1 locally proceeds as follows:
• If γ = 1 (i.e., when the termination condition holds), the
newly computed clusters are the final clusters which need
to be sent to each user Uj . For this purpose, C1 takes the
help of C2 to obliviously decrypt the results related to the
new cluster centers. More specifically, C1 initially picks
two sets of random numbers 〈r′h[s], r′′h〉 and computes
Oh[s] = Wh[s] ∗ Epk(r′h[s]) = Epk(λc′h [s] + rh[s] mod
N) and δh = Epk(|c′h|) ∗Epk(r′′h) = Epk(|c′h|+ r′′h mod
N), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l. After this, C1 sends
Oh[s] and δh to C2. In addition, C1 sends r′h[s] and r′′h to
each user Uj (through separate and secure communication
channels).
• For 1 ≤ s ≤ l, C2 successfully decrypts the received
encrypted values using his/her secret share sk to get
O′h[s] = Dsk(Oh[s]) and δ′h = Dsk(δh) which it
forwards to each user Uj (through separate and secure
communication channels). Observe that, due to the ran-
domization by C1, the values of O′h[s] and δ′h are random
numbers in ZN from C2’s perspective.
• Upon receiving the entry pairs 〈O′h, r′h〉 and 〈δ′h, r′′h〉, each
user Uj removes the random factors to get λc′
h
[s] =
O′h[s] − r
′
h[s] mod N and |c′h| = δ′h − r′′h mod N , for
1 ≤ h ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Finally, Uj computes the
final cluster center µc′
h
as µc′
h
[s] =
λc′
h
[s]
|c′
h
| and adds it to
his/her resulting set Sj .
• On the other hand, when γ = 0, then C1 locally updates
the current clusters to new clusters by setting Epk(λch) =
Wh and Epk(|ch|) = Epk(|c′h|), for 1 ≤ h ≤ k. After
this, the above process is repeated in an iterative manner
until the termination condition holds. That is, the protocol
goes to Step 3 of Algorithm 4 and executes Steps 3 to 6
with the updated cluster centers as input.
C. Security Analysis of PPODC under the Semi-honest Model
In this section, we show that the proposed PPODC protocol
is secure under the standard semi-honest model [18], [33].
Informally speaking, we stress that all the intermediate values
seen by C1 and C2 in PPODC are either encrypted or pseudo-
random numbers.
First, in the data outsourcing process (i.e., Step 1 of
Algorithm 4), the values received by C1 and C2 are either
random or pseudo-random values in ZN . At the end of the data
outsourcing step, only C1 knows the encrypted data records
of all users and no information regarding the contents of Tj
(the database of user Uj) is revealed to C2. Therefore, as long
as the underlying encryption scheme is semantically secure
(which is also the case in the Paillier cryptosystem [21]), the
aggregated encrypted databases do not reveal any information
to C1. Hence, no information is revealed to C1 and C2 during
Stage 1 of PPODC.
The implementations of SMP, SSED, and SLSB sub-
protocols given in [30], [34] are proven to be secure under
the semi-honest model [18]. Also, the SC protocol given in
[31] is secure under the semi-honest model. In the proposed
SSEDOP protocol, the computations are based on using either
SMP or SSED as a sub-routine. As a result, SSEDOP can be
TABLE II
ONLINE AND OFFLINE COMPUTATIONAL COSTS FOR DIFFERENT STAGES IN PPODCOPT
Stage Online Offline
Stage 1 (one-time) 6m ∗ l mul. 2m ∗ l exp.
Stage 2 (per iteration) m ∗ (2l ∗ k + l + 17k − 4
⌊
k
2
⌋
− 14) + k ∗ (l + 1) + 1 exp. m ∗ (7l ∗ k + 3l + 32k − 7
⌊
k
2
⌋
− 29) + k ∗ (3l + 1) + 1 exp.
Stage 3 (per iteration) k ∗ (2k + 5l) + 9 exp. k ∗ (4k + 9l+ 2) + 20 exp.
proven to be secure under the semi-honest model. Further,
since SMIN and SMINk are directly constructed from SC,
the security proofs for them directly follow from the security
proof of SC given in [31]. In summary, the privacy-preserving
primitives utilized in the proposed PPODC protocol are secure
under the semi-honest model.
We emphasize that the computations involved in Stages 2
and 3 of PPODC are performed by either C1 locally or using
one of the privacy-preserving primitives as a sub-routine. In
the former case, C1 operates on encrypted data locally. In
the latter case, the privacy-preserving primitives utilized in
our protocol are secure under the semi-honest model. Also, it
is important to note that the output of a privacy-preserving
primitive which is fed as input to the next primitive is in
encrypted format. Since we use a semantically secure Paillier
encryption scheme [19], all the encrypted results (which are
revealed only to C1) from the privacy-preserving primitives do
not reveal any information to C1. Note that the secret key sk
is unknown to C1. Hence, by Composition Theorem [33], we
claim that the sequential composition of the privacy-preserving
primitives lead to Stages 2 and 3 in our proposed PPODC
protocol and are secure under the semi-honest model. Putting
everything together, it is clear that PPODC is secure under the
semi-honest model.
D. Performance Analysis of PPODC
First of all, we emphasize that a direct implementation
of the proposed PPODC protocol is likely to be inefficient.
To address this issue, we propose two strategies to boost its
performance: (i) offline computation and (ii) reusability of
intermediate results. In what follows, we extensively analyze
the performance of PPODC based on these two strategies.
In the Paillier cryptosystem [19], encryption of an integer
a ∈ ZN is given by Epk(a) = ga∗rN mod N2, where g is the
generator, N is the RSA modulus, and r is a random number
in ZN . It is clear that Paillier’s encryption scheme requires
two expensive exponentiation operations. In this paper, we
assume g = N+1 (a commonly used setting that provides the
same security guarantee as the original Paillier cryptosystem)
as this allows for a more efficient implementation of Paillier
encryption [35]. More specifically, when g = N +1, we have
Epk(a) = (N + 1)
a ∗ rN mod N2
= (a ∗N + 1) ∗ rN mod N2 (8)
As a result, an encryption under Paillier is reduced to one ex-
ponentiation operation. Our main observation from Equation 8
is that the encryption cost under Paillier can be further reduced
as follows. The exponentiation operation (i.e., rN mod N2) in
the encryption function can be computed in an offline phase
and thus the online cost of computing Epk(a) is reduced
to two (inexpensive) multiplication operations2. Additionally,
encryption of random numbers, 0s and 1s can be precomputed
by the corresponding party (i.e., C1 or C2) as they are
independent of the underlying protocol.
We emphasize that the actual online computation costs (with
an offline phase) of the privacy-preserving primitives used in
our protocol can be much less than their costs without an
offline phase. For example, consider the secure multiplication
(SMP) primitive with Epk(a) and Epk(b) as C1’s private
input. During the execution of SMP, C1 has to initially
randomize the inputs and send them to C2. That is, C1 has
to compute Epk(a) ∗ Epk(r1) = Epk(a + r1 mod N) and
Epk(b)∗Epk(r2) = Epk(b+ r2 mod N), where r1 and r2 are
random numbers in ZN . This clearly requires C1 to compute
two encryptions: Epk(r1) and Epk(r2). However, since r1
and r2 are integers chosen by C1 at random, the computa-
tion of Epk(r1) and Epk(r2) is independent of any specific
instantiation of SMP. That is, C1 can precompute Epk(r1)
and Epk(r2) during the offline phase and thus boosting its
online computation time. In a similar manner, C1 and C2
can precompute certain intermediate results in each privacy-
preserving primitive.
To better understand the performance improvements due
to the above offline computation strategy, we have analyzed
the offline and online computation costs of each privacy-
preserving primitive (for a single execution) used in PPODC,
separately. The results are given in Table III. Here l denotes
number of attributes and k denotes number of desired clusters.
From our analyses, following from Table III, we observed that
the actual online computation cost (with an offline phase) of
each primitive is improved by at least 50% in comparison to
its online computation cost without an offline phase.
An important observation in PPODC is that some of the
intermediate results (apart from those computed during the
offline phase) computed in earlier steps can be reused in
later computations without affecting the security. This leads
to our second performance improvement strategy - reusability
of intermediate results. This would be better illustrated by
the following example. Consider that C1 with private input
〈Epk(a), Epk(b1)〉 and C2 jointly want to compute Epk(a ∗
b1) using SMP. During this process, C1 initially computes
Epk(a + r mod N) and Epk(b1 + r1 mod N) and sends
them to C2, where r and r1 are random numbers in ZN .
2The time that takes to perform one exponentiation under Z
N2
is equivalent
to log
2
N multiplication operations. Therefore, exponentiation is considered
to be an expensive operation in comparison to multiplication.
TABLE III
ONLINE AND OFFLINE COMPUTATION COSTS OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING
PRIMITIVES (MEASURED IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EXPONENTIATIONS)
Primitive Online Offline
SMP 2 4
SSED 3l 4l
SSEDOP 2k + 7l 4k + 12l
SLSB 1 3
SC 7 17
SMIN 14 30
SMINk 16k − 4
⌊
k
2
⌋
− 14 31k − 7
⌊
k
2
⌋
− 29
Upon receiving the ciphertexts, C2 decrypts them to get
a + r mod N and b1 + r1 mod N and proceeds with the
rest of the computations involved in SMP. At a later stage,
suppose C1 with private input 〈Epk(a), Epk(b2)〉 and C2 want
to compute Epk(a ∗ b2). The key observation here is that C1
can compute and send only Epk(b2+r2 mod N) to C2, where
r2 is a random number in ZN . That is, there is no need for
C1 to again compute Epk(a + r mod N) and send that to
C2. After receiving Epk(b2 + r2 mod N) from C1, C2 can
decrypt it to get b2+r2 mod N and use the intermediate result
a+r mod N already computed in the previous step to proceed
with further computations of SMP. The above example clearly
demonstrates that reusability of intermediate results can save
both computation and communication costs.
By taking both the above two strategies (i.e., offline compu-
tation and reusability of intermediate results) into considera-
tion, we could optimize the performance of PPODC. Without
loss of generality, let us denote such an implementation by
PPODCopt. We estimated the online and offline computa-
tional costs, measured in terms of required multiplication
(mul.) or exponentiation (exp.) operations, for each stage of
PPODCopt separately. The results are given in Table II. Here
m denotes the sum of the data records of all users. It is
important to note that Stage 1 of PPODCopt is run only once
whereas Stages 2 and 3 are run in an iterative fashion until
the termination condition holds.
The total communication costs for each stage of
PPODCopt are extensively analyzed and the results are shown
in Table IV. Here K denotes the size (in bits) of the Paillier
encryption key [19]. Following from our analyses, we can
observe that the costs (both computation and communication)
of Stage 2 are significantly higher (depends on m) than the
costs of Stage 3 in each iteration.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
First of all, we emphasize that PPODC is 100% accurate in
the sense that the outputs returned by PPODC and the standard
k-means clustering algorithm (applied on the corresponding
plaintext data) are the same. Therefore, in this section, we
extensively analyze the computation costs of PPODC by
performing various experiments using a real dataset under
different parameter settings. Note that ours is the first work
to address the PPODC problem and thus there exist no prior
work to compare with our protocol.
A. Platform and Dataset Description
We implemented the protocols (both the direct implemen-
tation and optimized version of PPODC) in C using the
GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library [36]. For
the optimized version of PPODC (denoted by PPODCopt),
we considered both the performance improvement strategies
mentioned in Section V-D. The experiments were conducted
on two Linux machines (playing the roles of C1 and C2),
each with an Intel R© CoreTM i7-2600 CPU (3.40GHz) and
8GB RAM, running Linux version 3.12.6. The two machines
were communicating over a TCP/IP network.
For our experiments on real dataset, we used the KEGG
Metabolic Reaction Network (Undirected) dataset from the
UCI KDD archive [37] that consists of 65,554 data records and
29 attributes. Since some of the attribute values are missing
in the dataset, we removed the corresponding data records
and the resulting dataset consists of 64,608 data records.
As part of the pre-processing, we normalized the attribute
values and scaled them into the integer domain [0, 1000].
Then we selected sample datasets (from the preprocessed data)
by choosing data records at random based on the parameter
values under consideration. We fixed the Paillier encryption
key size to 1,024 bits (a commonly accepted key size) in all our
experiments. For each sample dataset, we encrypted each of its
data record attribute-wise using the Paillier encryption function
[19] and stored this encrypted data on the first machine. Note
that the corresponding secret key sk is stored on the second
machine.
We executed PPODC and PPODCopt over the encrypted data
stored in the first machine under the above setting. The results
presented in the rest of this section are averaged over ten
sample datasets.
B. Empirical Analysis using Real Dataset
To see the actual efficiency gains of PPODCopt over
PPODC, we first evaluated their computation costs using
different sampled datasets of varying sizes. Specifically, we
fix the value of l and k to 10 and 8, respectively, and executed
PPODC and PPODCopt on datasets of varying number of
records m. The results per iteration are shown in Table V. On
the one hand, the running time of PPODC varies from 31.88
to 159.4 minutes when m varies from 2,000 to 10,000. On the
other hand, the online running time of PPODCopt varies from
11.72 to 58.58 minutes when m varies from 2,000 to 10,000.
From these results, it is clear that the online computation time
of the optimized version of PPODC is around 2.7 times less
than the online computation time of the direct implementation
of PPODC. That is, the performance improvement strategies
proposed in Section V-D boost the performance of PPODC by
60-65%. We emphasize that the running time reported in this
section also includes the communication costs, such as packet
encoding and decoding, and network delays.
TABLE IV
COMMUNICATION COSTS OF PPODCOPT
Stage Communication Cost (in bits)
Stage 1 (one-time) 4m ∗ l ∗K
Stage 2 (per iteration) (4m ∗ l ∗ k + 2l ∗ k + 2 ∗m ∗ l+ 21m ∗ k − 2m ∗
⌊
k
2
⌋
− 19m + 1) ∗ 2K
Stage 3 (per iteration) (k ∗ (3k + 6l + 2) + 15) ∗ 2K
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF RUNNING TIME (IN MINS) FOR l = 10 AND k = 8
m PPODC PPODCopt
(Direct Implementation) (Online + Offline) (Online)
2,000 31.88 23.52 11.72
4,000 63.76 47.04 23.43
6,000 95.64 70.56 35.15
8,000 127.52 94.08 46.87
10,000 159.4 117.6 58.58
Having shown the performance improvement of
PPODCopt over PPODC, we next analyze the online
computation costs of PPODCopt based on different parameters.
The computation cost of PPODCopt per iteration mainly
depends on three parameters: (i) the number of data records
of all users (m), (ii) the number of attributes (l), and (iii)
the number of clusters (k). Therefore, we evaluate the
performance of PPODCopt by varying these three parameters.
For m = 6, 000, Figure 2(a) shows the online running time
of PPODCopt for varying values of l and k. For example, when
l = 10 and k = 8, the online running time of PPODCopt is
36.14 minutes. The online running time of PPODCopt for l =
10 and varying values of k and m are shown in Figure 2(b).
The observation is that the running time grows linearly with k
and m. As shown in Figure 2(c), when k = 8, a similar trend
is observed for varying values of m and l . Putting everything
together, it is clear that the running time of PPODCopt grows
linearly with m, k and l. This further justifies our theoretical
analysis in Section V-D.
We observed that around 99% of the computation time of
PPODCopt is due to Stage 2. Also, the running time of each
user is in few milliseconds (since he/she doesn’t involve in any
expensive operations), which makes our protocol very efficient
from the end-user’s computational perspective. In summary,
the above results show that the proposed PPODC protocol,
together with our optimizations, achieves reasonable efficiency
given the stronger privacy guarantees.
A Note on Scalability. We emphasize that the computation
costs of PPODCopt can be high for large datasets. However,
it is worth noting that the performance of PPODCopt can be
further improved by parallelizing the underlying operations.
This is because the assignment of each data record to a new
cluster in Stage 2 is independent of other records and thus
we can almost parallelize the computations of Stage 2 at
the record level. More specifically, C1 and C2 can utilize a
cluster of nodes to perform their respective computations in
parallel. Note that most of the current cloud service providers,
such as Google and Amazon, typically support parallel pro-
cessing on high performance computing nodes. Some of the
large-scale parallel processing frameworks include Spark and
Hadoop. Hence, by properly exploiting the parallel processing
capability of clouds, we believe that the scalability issue of
PPODCopt can be addressed to a great extent.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Existing privacy-preserving distributed clustering tech-
niques, which can allow the users to collaboratively and
securely perform the clustering task, incur heavy costs (both
communication- and computation-wise) on the participating
users. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduced
the problem of privacy-preserving and outsourced distributed
clustering (PPODC) where a set of users can securely out-
source their databases and the intended clustering task to a
cloud environment. We proposed a novel PPODC protocol
under a federated cloud environment that can perform the k-
means clustering on the users aggregated encrypted data in
a privacy-preserving manner. At the core of our protocol, we
proposed new transformations to construct an order-preserving
Euclidean distance function and evaluate the termination con-
dition of the k-means clustering algorithm over encrypted data.
The proposed PPODC protocol ensures data confidentiality
of all users and incurs negligible costs on the user side. We
theoretically estimated the complexities of our protocol and
experimentally analyzed its efficiency using a real dataset.
Our results show that our protocol incurs reasonable costs on
the cloud side and is practical for non-real-time applications.
One important contribution of our protocol is that most of its
underlying computations can be parallelized. As future work,
we plan to implement the proposed protocol using parallelism
on a cluster of nodes and evaluate its performance. Also,
we will extend the research ideas proposed in this paper to
other data mining tasks, such as classification, association rule
mining, and regression analysis.
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